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be bound by such an order as emanating from the 
authority under which it sits." 
It is obvious that in the process of naval warfare in the 
present day such vessels may without difficulty and with 
great secrecy be used in various ways to help the enemy. 
If they are, their imn1unity \Vould disappear; and it 
would be open to the naval authorities under the Crown 
to exclude from such immunity all similar vessels if there 
was reason for believing that some of them were utilized 
for aiding the enemy. And this seems to be the sense in 
which the second paragraph of article 3 of The Hague 
convention referred to should be regarded. 
As to the Berlin, I am of opinion that she is not \Vithin 
the category of coast fishing vessels entitled to freedom 
from capture; on the contrary, I hold that, by reason 
of her size, equipment, and voyage, she \Vas a deep-sea 
fishing vessel engaged in a commercial enterprise \Vhich 
formed part of the trade of the enemy country, and, as 
such, could be and \Vas properly captured as prize of war. 
I therefore decree the condemnation of the vessel and 
cargo, and order the sale thereof. 
THE "MIRAl\11CID." 
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. 
PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND AD~IIRALTY DIVISION. 
ADJ\IIRALTY. 
[IN PRIZE.] 
November 23, 1914. 
[1914] p. 71. 
9 
Decision. 
The subject matter of the claim in this case is a part statement of the 
case. 
cargo of 16,000 bushels of wheat carried on the steamship 
Miramichi, which was seized or captured as enemy 
property on September 1, 1914, in the circumstances 
hereinafter mentioned. 
The steamship Miramichi was a British ship. The 
cargo of wheat to which the claim relates was shipped 
at Galveston, Tex., and \Vas stowed, \vith other \Vheat_, 
in holds 1, 4, and 6 of the vessel. It was shipped in the 
month of July, 1914, before the commencement of the 
war, and without any anticipation of war. It \Vas 
destined for the port of Rotterdam, and was intended to 
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be delivered, as to part, to George Fries & Co., of Colmar, 
as purchasers of 8,000 bushels, and, as to the other part, 
to Gebrueder Zimmern & Co., of Mannheim, as pur-
chasers of 8,000 bushels. Both these firms were German 
firms, and at the time of seizure or capture of the cargo 
were enemy subjects. 
The two transactions were separate; but there is no 
distinction in substance, or from the legal aspect, be-
tween the two. It will therefore be sufficient to deal in 
this judgment with one of the cases; and I will take the 
first, namely, the case of the sale by Messrs. Muir & Co. 
to Fries & Co. 
The cargo of wheat destined for Fries & Co. was, as 
I have said, laden on board the British steamship 
Miramichi. On her voyage toward Rotterdam, her 
owners by telegraph directed the vessel to proceed to 
Queenstown for orders by reason of the outbreak of war. 
At Queenstown the owners communicated with the 
British Admiralty and asked their instructions as to 
whether the steamship could proceed to Rotterdam, as 
the cargo was destined for German merchants. Per-
mission to proceed to Rotterdam was refused, and 
accordingly the vessel proceeded to the port of Eastham, 
in the Manchester Ship Canal, as the best port for the 
disposal of the cargo. 
A question might have arisen as to whether the cargo 
was captured at sea or seized in port. But that makes 
no material difference in this case, and it is agreed that 
the cargo was seized in the port of Eastham. 
The seizure was on September 1, 1914. The Crown 
claims the cargo as prize or as droi ts of admiralty. The 
claimants, on the other hand, contend that the cargo 
was not subject to seizure as it did not belong to enemy 
subjects, but to themselves as neutrals, being citizens of 
the United States of America. 
November 23. SIR SA]tfUEL EvANS, president. [Mter 
stating the facts already set out the learned president 
continued:] The contest between the Crown and the 
claimants may be shortly stated as follows: 
The contention of the attorney general for the Cro'vn 
was that the cargo at the time of seizure was at the risk 
of subjects of the German Empire, then at 'var, as pur-
chasers, and therefore was subject to seizure on behalf of 
the Cro,vn. The contention of the claimants, on the con-
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trary, \Vas that the cargo was their property, and there-
fore could not be lawfully seized. 
The facts as to the contract for sale and purchase of the Contract for sale and purchase. 
cargo must now be stated in substance, but briefly. 
I will premise that the contract, and all material trans-
actions in relation to it up to the time of seizure of the 
cargo, were entered into before the war and in entire inno-
cence of any anticipation of war. In short, all the trans-
actions so far as concerned the claimants \Vere carried out 
in times and conditions of peace. The claimants \Vere 
the sellers of the goods, and their bankers who discounted 
the bill of exchange. They have made common cause, 
and no distinction need be made between them in this 
judgment. I 'viii describe the claimants, Messrs. Muir & 
Co., as "the sellers," and Fries & Co., the German mer-
chants, as ''the buyers." 
The sellers contracted to sell the cargo to the buyers on 
June 25 for shipment during the month of July, 1914, 
from a port of the United States of America direct or indi-
rect to Rotterdam at a price to include cost, freight, and 
insurance; in other words, the contract was \Vhat is so 
well known as a c. i. f. contract. Payment (or in the 
American terminology "reimbursement") was to be "by 
check against documents." The sellers \Vere to furnish 
policies of insurance, or certificates of insurance (free of 
war risk). A clause for settlement of disputes in London 
was included, which shows . (apart from anything else) 
that any disputes \Vere to be determined according to 
English law. 
The sellers had bought the wheat to enable them to 
fulfill their contract 'vith the buyers from C. B. Fox, a 
grain merchant in Galveston. 
The wheat \Vas shipped by Fox at Galveston on July 
23, 1914. The bill of lading "\Vas given in favor of Fox, 
the shipper, and \Vas made out unto the order of one 
Davis, or to his or their assigns. , It \Vas indorsed gener-
ally, and in due course the sellers paid Fox for the 'vheat 
and obtained the bill of lading. They did not indorse it 
in favor of the buyers, and it remained a bill of lading only 
indorsed generally. 
The necessary insurances \Vere effected and the certifi-
cates of insurance were obtained by the sellers on July 23. 
On July 28 the sellers dre\V a bill of exchange upon the 
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general, discounted it with the bankers (the Guaranty 
Trust Co. of New York, 'vho have joined them as claim-
ants). On the same date they deposited 'vith the bank-
ers the bill of lading and certificates of insurance to be 
delivered upon payment by the buyers through a Berlin 
bank of the amount due on the bill of exchange for the 
cost and insurance, less the freight, 'vhich was credited, 
as it was to be paid for by the buyers on delivery. 
On the same date also the original documents were for-
warded to the Berlin bank for credit of the N e'v York 
bank by the steamship Sa'voie, which sailed from N e'v 
York on July 29 and arrived at Le Havre on August 5; 
and duplicate docu1nents were forwarded by the steam-
ship Garmania, which sailed from N e'v York on July 29 
and arrived at Liverpool on August 7. The buyers were 
duly notified of these matters, and an invoice was for-
warded to them by the sellers on the same day (July 28) 
with all the necessary particulars of the shipment, bill 
of exchange, and documents. 
So far as the buyers are concerned, no further informa-
tion was given to the court except that the documents 
were tendered to them, and that on the tender they re-
fused to accept the documents, or to pay the sum due 
under the bill of exchange and indorsed on the bill of 
lading as follows: "Refused on account of late production, 
nearly one month after normal due date. Colmar, Sep-
tember 3, 1914. Geo. Frie~." 
That reason was a mere excuse; the real reason, no 
doubt, was that 'var had broken out. The sellers, 
therefore, or their bankers, still hold the bill of lading, 
and the bill of exchange remains unpaid. 
These, I think, are all the rna terial facts. 
The question of law, as I have stated, is, Was the cargo 
on September 1 subject to seizure or capture by or on 
behalf of the Crown as droits of adn1iralty or prize~ 
Before this question is dealt with, I desire to point out, 
and to emphasize, that 'nothing which I shall say in this 
case is applicable to capture or seizure at sea or in port 
of any property dealt with during the 'var, or in antici-
pation of the war. Questions relating to such property 
arc on an entirely different footing from those relating 
to transactions initiated during the happier ti1nes of 
peace. 'fhe former are determined largely or mainly 
upon considerations of the rights of belligerents and of 
attempts to defeat such rights. I 'viii refrain from dis-
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cussing these matters, and 'vill only refer to such authori-
ties as the Sally, 9 hearcL on appeal by the Lords Commis-
sioners of Appeals in prize in 1795, the Packet de Bilbao/0 
and the ... 4riel, 11 for the principles applicable in the prize 
court during a state of war. 
In the case· now before the court, there is no place for 
any idea of an attempt to defeat the rights of this country 
as a belligerent; and the case has to be determined in 
accordance with the principles by which rights of prop-
erty are ascertained by our la'v in time of peace. 
The main contest was as to the right test to apply 
in these circumstances for determining whether a par-
ticular property was subject to seizure or capture. 
Another point was taken and argued, chiefly by junior 
counsel for the claimants, that in any event enen1y 
property in a British ship could not.be seized in port or 
captured n,t sea. 
I will state the contention and propositions submitted 
by the learned attorney general in his own \Vords. 
He said, "My first proposition is that the test of the 
right to capture and sale is the answer to the question 
on whom is the risk at the moment of cnpture? That 
is to say, Who suffers if the goods are captured~ Applying 
that test, the A1nerican claimants here \vould have had 
a 'jus disponendi' because they are holding the bill of 
lading, which has not been indorsed, and therefore they 
would have to that extent of course a special propPrty, 
a property interest in the cargo, but th<:'y \Vould not 
have a general property in the cargo; still·less \Vould they 
have the risk; and there is a third proposition, \Vhich is 
really a development of the other proposition, nan1el.\~ , 
the American sellers had a vested right of pay1nrnt ~ 
\vhatever happened to the goods on the tend<:'r of the 
documents; and I \viii add as a point for 1ny third propo-
sition that for the purpose of determining \vhcther tho 
cargo is good prize (which is quite a separate question 
from ~he other), the material question is not the abstract 
question of property, but \Vhether it is an enemy or a 
neutral \vho ·will suffer if the cargo is condemned- on 
whom is the risk~" And· summing it up the learned 
attorney general later submitted, "If my main propo-
sition is right, in a prize court one is not concerned \vith 
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Beneficial 
.ownership. 
these niceties about the abstract law of property; but 
the point really is, at the moment of capture, the goods 
being on the high seas, is it or not open to the consignor 
to compel payment by the consignee~ That is the real 
test. Then plainly I am entitled here to the condemna-
tion of the goods." 
As I have intimated, it was subsequently assumed, and 
for this purpose agreed by the attorney general, that the 
goods were seized when afloat in port; but that makes no 
material difference. 
The contrary contention of Mr. Leslie Scott for the 
claimants was that "the true criterion to apply where 
goods are shipped before war is, Whose goods are they 1 
In whom is the property-in the sense of a beneficial 
ownership of the- goods-vested~" 
Very difficult quastions often arise at law as to 'vhen 
the property in goods carried by sea is transferred, or 
vests; and at whose risk goods are at a particular time, 
or· who suffers by their loss. 
These are the kind of questions which are often brushed 
aside in the prize court when the transactions in 'vhich 
they are involved take place during war or 'vere em-
barked in when war 'vas imminent or anticipated. 
But where, as in the present case, all the material 
parts of the business transaction took place bona fide 
during peace, and it becomes necessary to decide ques-
tions of property, I hold that the law to be applied is the 
ordinary municipal lavv governing contracts for the sale 
and purchase of goods. 
Tran s t e r in Where !!Oods are contracted to be sold and are shipped peace. ._. 
during peace without any anticipation of imminent war, 
and are seized or captured afloat after war has super-
vened, the cardinal principle is, in my opinion, that they 
are not subject to seizure or capture unless under the 
contract the property in the goods has by that time 
passed to the enemy. 
It may be that the element of risk may legitimately 
enter into the consideration of the question 'vhether the 
property has passed or has become transferred. But the 
incidence of risk or loss is no't by any means the deter-
mining factor of property or o'vnership. (Cf. s. 20 of the 
sale of goods act, 1893.) The main determining factor is 
whether according to the intention of seller and buyer 
the property had passed. 
INTERNATIONAL LA\V: DECISIONS AND NOTES. 
The question which governs this case, therefore, is, 
\vhose property \vere the goods at the time of seizure~ 
This principle is consonant \vith good sense, and with 
the notion of \vhat is right in comn1ercial dealings. It is 
also in accordance with the doctrines adopted by the 
eminent jurists V{ho have become authorities on the law 
of nations, and applied in the decisions of our prize 
courts (sec e. g., The Oousine Marianne, 12 The Ida, 13 The 
Abo,14 The Vrow Margaretha/5 and The Ar·iel.16 
The learned attorney general by the tenor of his argu-
ment rendered it almost unnecessary for me to go through 
the many authorities dealing \Vith the vesting or transfer 
of property under such a contract, or to discuss the ques-
tion whether the property in this case had, on Septem-
ber 1, passed from the sellers and become vested in the 
buyers. 
He did not, as I understood, argue that the property 
had passed to the enemy buyers. Fie admitted that the 
neutral sellers had a jus disponendi, because they held 
the bill of lading, which \Vas not indorsed; although pos-
sibly he may have intended to qualify this adn1ission by 
saying that ''Therefore the sellers \Vould have, to that 
extent, a special property'' in the goods. 
But at any rate, as he did not contend that by law the 
property had passed to the buyers, I think it sufficient to 
deal very briefly with the matter, and to state my con-
clusions \vithout elaborating the grounds. 
In my opinion the result of the many decisions from 
Wait v. Baker17 up to Ogg v. Shutcr, 18 ~1irabita v. Otto-
man Bank/9 and thence up to the sale of goods act, 1893, 
and of the provisions of the sale of goods act, 1893, itself, 
following closely on these matters the judgment of Cot-
ton L. J., in Mirabita v. Ottoman Bank19 (3); and of the 
decisions subsequent to the act, c. g., Dupont v. British 
South Africa Co.,20 Ryan v. Ridley,21 and Biddcll v. E. 
Clemens Horst22 , is that, in the circumstances of the pres-
ent case, the goods had not at the time of seizure passed 
to the buyers; but that the sellers had reserved a right 
12 (1810) Edw. 346. 
13 (I854) Spinks, 26. 
H (I854) Spinks, 42. 
1s (I799) I C. Rob. 336. 
16 11 ~loo. P. C. 119. 
17 08·i8) 2 Ex. I. 
18 (I875) I C. P. D. 47. 
19 (I878) 3 Ex. D. I64. 
2o (I90I) 18 Times L. R. 24. 
21 (I902) 8 Com. Cas. 105. 
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of disposal or a jus disponendi over them, and that the 
goods still remained their property, and would so remain 
until the shipping documents had been tendered to and 
taken over by the buyers, and the bill of exchange for the 
price had been paid. 
It follows that the goods seized 'vere the property of the 
American claimants, and 'vere not subject to seizure; 
the court decrees according! y, and orders the goods to be 
released to the claimants. 
The other point referred to remains; and as it was 
argued and has been foreshadowed in other cases, I ,viii 
deal \vith it, although, in view of the decision just given, 
it becomes immaterial. 
is~~~~~. in Brit- It is that as the cargo 'vas in a British ship, it could 
not be seized or captured even if it was enemy property. 
Wheaton's 
opinion. 
In my opinion this proposition is wholly lacking in 
foundation. No authority was cited for it. Such a 
contention has never been put forward, because, as I 
think, no one has thought that it could prevail. 
Enemy property at sea or in port can be captured or 
seized except where an express immunity has been 
created. 
Abundance of authority exists for this in the acknowl-
edged books of international jurists. I will only cite 
one, namely, Wheaton; I will cite from what is regarded 
as the best edition, that of Mr. Dana, published in 1866. 
After an exhaustive and most interesting account of 
the right of capt·ure according to the usage of 'var on 
land and on sea, Wheaton wrote as follows: ''Section 
355. The progress of civilization has slo,vly, but con-
stantly, tended to soften the extreme severity of the 
operations of war by land; but it still remains unrelaxed 
in respect to maritime warfare, in which the private 
property of the enemy taken at sea or afloat in port is 
indiscriminately liable to capture and confiscation. 
This inequality in the operation of the la,vs of 'var, by 
land and by sea, has been justified by alleging the usage 
of considering private property, 'vhen captured in cities 
taken by storm, as booty; and the 'vell-kno"\vn fact that 
contributions are levied upon territories occupied by a 
hostile army, in lieu of a general confiscation of the 
property belonging to the inhabitants; and that the 
object of 'vars by land being conquest or the acquisition 
of territory to be exchanged as an equivalent for other 
territory lost, the regard of the victor for those who are 
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to be or have been his subjects naturally restrains him 
from the exercise of his extreme rights in this particular; 
'vherea.s, the object of maritime 'vars is the destruc-
tion of the enemy's commerce and navigation-the sources 
and sine,vs of his naval po,ver-vlhich object can only 
be attained by the capture and confiscation of private 
property.'' 
I 'vill also cite Mr. Dana's note upon this section as it 
'vas written years after the declaration of Paris. 
17 
''Note 171. Distinction bet,vcen enen1y's property at m~tna' s com-
sea and on land. The text docs not present the principal 
argument for the distinction observed in practice be-
t,veen private property on land and at sea; nor, indeed, 
has this subject been adequately treated upon principle, 
if that has even been atten1pted, by most text 'vriters. 
War is the exercise of force by bodies politic for the 
purpose of coercion. Niodern civilization has recognized 
certain modes of coercion as justifiable. 'fheir exercise 
upon material in~erests is preferable to acts of force 
upon the person. Where private property is taken, it 
is because it is of such a character or so situated as to 
n1ake its capture a justifiable means of coercing the po,ver 
'vith which 've are at 'var. If the hostile po,ver has an 
interest in the property which is available to hiin for 
the purposes of 'var, that fact Inakes it prima facie a 
subject of capture. The enemy has such an interest in 
all convertible and mercantile property 'vithin his control, 
or belonging to persons who are living under his control, 
whether it he on land or at sea; for it is a subject of taxa-
tion, contribution, or confiscation. 'fhe humanity and 
policy of modern times have abstained fron1 the taking 
of private property, not liable to direct use in ,v·ar, 'vhcn 
on land. Son1e of the reasons for this are the infinite 
varieties of the character of such property-fron1 things 
almost sacred. to those purely merchantable; the difficulty 
of discriminating among these varieties: the need of 
much of it to support the life of noncombatant persons 
and of animals; the unlimited range of places and objects 
that 'vould be opened to the military; anfl the n1oral 
dangers attending searches an<l captures in households 
and among noncotnhatants. J)ut on the high SPH~ thPsP 
reasons do not apply. Strictl.v pPrsona] efl'ects are not 
taken. Cargoes arc usually purely 1nerch undise. ~[ t•r-
chandise sent to sen i3 sent voluntarily; ern hnrkecl hy 
n1erchants on an enterprise of profit, taking the risks of 
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war; its value is usually capable of compensation in 
money, and may be protected by insurance; it is in the 
custody of men trained and paid for the purpose; and 
the sea, upon which it is sent, is res omnium, the common 
field of war as well as of commerce. The purpose of 
maritime commerce is the enriching of the o\vner by the 
transit over this common field; and it is the usual object 
of revenue to the po,ver under whose government the 
owner resides. 
summary. "The matter may, then, be summed up thus: Merchan-
dise, \Vhether embarked upon the sea or found on land, 
in which the hostile power has some interest for purposes 
of \var, is prima facie a subject of capture. Vessels and 
their cargoes ate usually of that character. Of the infinite 
varieties of property on shore some are of this character 
and some not. There are very serious objections of a 
moral and economical nature to subjecting all property 
on land to military seizure. These objections have been 
thought sufficient to reverse the prima facie right of cap-
ture. '1'o 1nerchandise at sea these objections apply with 
so little force that the prima facie right of capture 
remains.'' 
There is no distinction no\V tq be made bet\veen capture 
at sea and seizure in port; and apart from the practice 
introduced by the declaration of Paris in favor of neutral 
vessels it does not matter in what ships the cargoes seized 
cil~~i~~ iu c ouu- or captured may happen to be. According to the order 
made in council, in 1665, as to the rights of the Lord High 
Admiral in former times, which are no\V the rights of the 
l(ing in his office of admiralty, ''all ships and goods 
coming into ports, creeks, or roads of England or Ireland, 
unless they come in voluntarily on revolt or are driven 
in by the King's cruisers," belonged to the lord high 
admiral, and now belong to the Cro\vn, and according to 
Lord Stowell, "Usage has construed this to include ships 
and goods already come into ports, creeks, or roads, and 
these not only of England and Ireland, but of all the 
dominions thereunto belonging"; see the Rebeckah. 23 
Eu(lmy goods It has never been urged that enemy goods are free from 
in Uritish ~hips. 
capture or seizure if they happen to be in British ships. 
'fhis is, no doubt, the reason \vhy there are no reported 
judgments upon the point, but if decisions of prize courts 
are desired to shov.r that enemy cargoes in British ships 
have been captured, reference can be made to the Con-
23 (1799) I. C. R ob. 227. 
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queror 24 and the Mashona, 25 and the Journal of Compara-
tive Legislation, 1900, page 326. See also The Cargo ex 
Emulous,26 sub nomine Bro,vn v. The United States,27 for 
the opinion of Story J. in similar cases. 
As to the suggestion that the right of seizure or capture 
of enemy property carried as cargoes in British ships no 
longer exists after the declaration of Paris, it is obvious 
that the declaration only modified or limited the right in 
favor of neutrals for the benefit and protection of the 
commerce of neutrals and in the interest of international 
comities, and did not in any other respect weaken or 
destroy the general right. 
It is well kno,vn that the United States of Americatr.i~~erican 
refrained from acceding to the declaration of Paris 
because they desired that all property of private persons 
should be exempted from capture at sea-to which most 
other States have always refused to agree. 
And in practice what would become of such cargoes~ 
A British ship could not, in times of 'var, carry it or hand 
it over to the enemy either directly or through any inter-
mediary, as it is not permitted to her to have any inter-
course with the enemy. 
In my view it is abundantly clear that enemy goods 
carried in British vessels are subject to seizure in port and 
capture at sea in times of war. 
As the cargo has been sold, the order of the court will 
be for the payment out of the proceeds to the claimants. 
The ATTORNEY GENERAL. I ask for a reasonable time 
for appealing. 
The PRESIDENT. Certainly. Stay of proceedings for 
three weeks, and, if notice is given for appeal, stay of 
proceedings will be till the hearing of the appeal. 
THE "MARIA." 
IN H. B. 1f. PRIZE COURT FOR EGYPT. 
:March 17, 19] 5. 
1 Trehern, British and Colonial Prize Cases, 259. 
19 
doc-
Claim for condemnation of the Turkish sailing ship c~t~.tcnwut or tho 
Maria, a vessel of 27 tons engaged in general coasting 
u (1800) 2 C. Rob. 303. 
2s (1900) 10 Cape Times L. R. 163. 
26 (1813) 1 Gallison, 563. 
21 (1814) 8 Cranch, 110. 
